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Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a Motion to Quash Information on 
one count of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code section 76-6-408, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Michelle Christiansen, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(d). See Addendum A (Order Granting Permission 
to Appeal). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the district court violated the rule announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Brickey1 and Mr. Dykes's due process rights when it denied Mr. 
Dykes's Motion to Quash, even though the State, without new or previously unavailable 
evidence, refiled a charge that was previously found to be unsupported by sufficient 
1
 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) 
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evidence after a preliminary hearing where no evidence was presented on an element of 
the offense. 
Standard of Review: A lower court's application of the Brickey rule is an 
interpretation of case law that this Court reviews for correctness, according no deference 
to the lower court's legal conclusion. See State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, f 13, 37 P.3d 
1160. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved in the Record from District Court Case No. 
101901771, at 21-812 (Motion to Quash Information); R71:102 (Minutes from Motion to 
Quash Hearing); R71:l 14 (Transcript from Motion to Quash Hearing); R71:103-05 
(Ruling and Order Denying Motion to Quash). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are determinative of the issue on appeal. Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum B. 
Utah Const, art. 1, sec. 7. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (LexisNexis 2008). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (LexisNexis 2008). 
2
 Because this case involves multiple dismissals and refilings of charges filed 
under different case numbers in the district court each time, the record on appeal contains 
separately paginated pleadings and transcripts under two different district court case 
numbers—Case No. 091905392 and Case No. 101901771. For ease of reference, each 
separately paginated portion of the record will be cited as "R" for record followed by the 
last two numbers of the district court case number—either "71" or "92"—followed by a 
colon and the page number in the record. If the record cite is to the first page of a 
transcript, any pincite to individual pages of that transcript will be preceded by a second 
colon. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Dykes by information with one count of Theft by Receiving 
Stolen Property, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-408. 
See R71:21, 30. At a preliminary hearing before the Third District Court, the court 
dismissed the charge without prejudice because the State's witnesses were not present. 
SeeR71:21, 33, 115:3. 
The State refiled the charge in the Third District Court, again charging Mr. Dykes 
with Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code section 76-6-408. R92:2; R71:22, 36. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
found probable cause to bind Mr. Dykes over on the charge. R71:22, 39; R92:116:19. 
Mr. Dykes moved to quash the bindover because, among other reasons, the item 
he was alleged to have stolen was not an operable motor vehicle under Utah Code section 
76-6-408, the Theft by Receiving Stolen Property Statute, and, therefore, did not 
aggravate the offense to the level of a Second Degree Felony. R92:18-25. The Second 
Degree Felony variant of this offense requires as an element that the item alleged stolen 
be either an operable motor vehicle, a firearm, or valued at over $5,000. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a) (2008). At the hearing on this motion, the district court did not 
quash the bindover, but agreed that there was insufficient evidence to bind Mr. Dykes 
over on a Second Degree Felony and ordered the Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 
charge bound over as a Class B Misdemeanor. R92:54, 117:15-16. The State responded 
with two motions—first to bind the charge over as a Class A Misdemeanor, and second, 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to reopen the preliminary hearing to present additional evidence. R92:54, 117:17. The 
district court denied these motions. R92:54, 117:17-18. 
Mr. Dykes then moved the district court to dismiss the Class B Misdemeanor 
charge, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Class B 
Misdemeanors and that Class B Misdemeanor charges should instead be filed in the 
appropriate justice court. R92:66-67. The district court granted the motion and dismissed 
the charge without prej udice. R92:6 8; 118:5. 
The State refiled the Theft by Receiving Stolen Property charge in the Third 
District Court, this time as a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-
6-408. R71 :l-2. At the time of the alleged offense, Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 
was a third degree felony if the allegedly stolen property was valued between $1,000 and 
$5,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(i) (2008). Mr. Dykes filed a motion to 
quash the information, arguing that the State's refiling of charges violated his due process 
rights as outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986). R71:21—27. At the hearing on this motion, the State offered two exhibits as 
evidence of the value of the allegedly stolen item. R71:l 14:11; 120-21. The same judge 
who denied the State's earlier motions to bind Mr. Dykes over on a Class A 
Misdemeanor and reopen the preliminary hearing denied Mr. Dykes's Motion to Quash 
the Information. R71:103-06; see Addendum C (Ruling and Order). 
Mr. Dykes filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal asking this 
Court to review the district court's denial of his Motion to Quash. See R71:107. This 
Court granted that petition on October 19, 2010. See Addendum A. This appeal follows. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 10, 2009, the State charged Mr. Dykes by Information with one count of 
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-6-408 and Utah Code section 76-6-412(l)(a). See R71:21, 30. The district 
court dismissed the case without prejudice when the State's witnesses failed to appear for 
a preliminary hearing on June 25, 2009. See R71:21, 33, 115:3. 
On July 10, 2009, the State refiled the case, again charging Mr. Dykes by 
Information with one count of theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-408. R92:2-3. The charging document alleged 
that the level of offense was a Second Degree Felony because the value of the stolen 
property "was or exceeded $5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an operable 
motor vehicle." R92:2; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1 )(a) (LexisNexis 2008). 
The probable cause statement alleged that Mr. Dykes was in possession of a stolen 4-
wheelerATV.R92:3. 
At the preliminary hearing, the State called one witness, West Valley Police 
Officer Patrick Plese. R92:l 16:2-16. Officer Plese testified that on April 7, 2009, he was 
monitoring traffic near 3800 South and Redwood Road when he saw an ATV turn onto 
Redwood Road. R92:l 16:2-3. He determined that it must be some type of violation to 
drive an ATV on the road since it was not possible to make that type of four-wheeler road 
legal, so he requested that the driver, Mr. Dykes, pull into a driveway. R92:l 16:3-4. 
Officer Plese noticed that the ATV was a few years old, in decent condition and that the 
factory yellow paint had been partially repainted. R92:l 16:4-5. Mr. Dykes told Officer 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plese that he owned the ATV and that he bought it from someone named Gary Smith. 
R92:116:5-6. He also told Officer Plese that he had not yet registered the ATV in his 
name and that he thought it was still registered to Gary Smith. £ee R92:116:5-6. Mr. 
Dykes found the ATV's registration and provided it to Officer Plese. R92:l 16:6. Officer 
Plese determined that the ATV was a 2004 Honda Rancher registered to Myrna Robb, 
and that the ATV was reported stolen out of Nephi, Utah. R92:l 16:6-7. Officer Plese 
then arrested Mr. Dykes. R92:116:7-8. 
Officer Plese further testified that he went to Mr. Dykes's residence to try and 
locate an additional ATV and trailer that were reported stolen at the same time as the 
2004 Honda Rancher ATV, but found nothing. R92:l 16:8-9. Officer Plese admitted he 
did not do any investigation into the existence of Gary Smith. R92:l 16:14-15. 
In addition to Officer Plese's testimony, the State introduced two 1102 statements. 
R92:50-53, 116:6, 8.The first statement was from Danny Robb. R92:50-51. The 
statement provided that Danny Robb and his wife Myrna Robb are the owners of the 
2004 Honda Rancher ATV Mr. Dykes was driving on April 7, 2009, that on or about 
January 8, 2009, Mr. Robb's 2004 Honda Rancher ATV, along with his sister-in-law 
Karin Robb's 2004 Honda Rubicon ATV and trailer, were stolen from Karin's residence 
in Nephi, Utah. R92:50-51. Danny Robb stated that he did not know Mr. Dykes and 
never gave Mr. Dykes permission to use his 2004 Honda Rancher ATV. R92:50-51. The 
statement also stated that the 2004 Honda Rancher ATV had been partially repainted. 
R92:50-51. The statement did not give the value of the 2004 Honda Rancher ATV. 
R92:50-51. Indeed, no evidence of the value of the 2004 Honda Rancher ATV was 
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presented at the preliminary hearing either by way of testimony or any 1102 statement. 
R92:116:17. 
The second 1102 statement was from Karin Robb. R92:52-53, 116:8.This 
statement provided that she owned a 2004 Honda Rubicon ATV and a trailer and that on 
or about January 8, 2009, her ATV and trailer, and Danny Robb's ATV, were stolen from 
her residence. R92:52. As part of Karin Robb's statement, a receipt for her 2004 Honda 
Rubicon ATV was submitted, which showed the 2004 Honda Rubicon ATV was 
purchased for $5,849.19. R92:53. Karin Robb also averred that Mr. Dykes did not have 
permission to be in possession of her 2004 Honda Rubicon ATV. R92:52. However, Mr. 
Dykes was never in possession of the 2004 Honda Rubicon ATV, and he was never 
charged with a crime related to this ATV. 
At the close of the preliminary hearing, defense counsel argued against bindover 
because there was not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that Mr. Dykes 
knew or probably believed the ATV was stolen and because no evidence was presented 
on the element of the value of the 2004 Honda Rancher ATV. R92.116:16-17. The State 
responded that there was no evidence of value because an ATV is an operable motor 
vehicle and value was an alternative, and the State had otherwise presented sufficient 
evidence for bindover. R92.116:18. The magistrate acknowledged that there was no 
evidence of value presented but bound Mr. Dykes over as charged nonetheless. 
R92:116:18-19. 
Mr. Dykes filed a motion to quash the bindover, arguing that factually, there was 
insufficient evidence to bind the defendant over for trial when no evidence, beyond pure 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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speculation, was presented that Mr. Dykes believed that the ATV had probably been 
stolen. R92:18-22. In addition, Mr. Dykes argued for the trial court to quash the bindover 
because there was no evidence of value presented at the preliminary hearing and, under 
the theft statute, an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle. R92:22-25. 
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Dykes's motion to quash. R92:l 17. In 
addition to arguing the evidence was insufficient, defense counsel argued that an ATV is 
not an operable motor vehicle, and, since there was no evidence of value presented, the 
court should quash the bindover. R92:l 17:1-6. Specifically, defense counsel argued that 
since the term "operable motor vehicle5' is not defined anywhere in the theft statutes 
under which Mr. Dykes was charged, the Court should look to the definition of "motor 
vehicle" provided in Utah Code section 76-6-410.5(1 )(a), Theft of a Rental Vehicle, 
which is under the same Chapter (Offenses Against Property) and Part (Theft) as the 
offense of theft by receiving stolen property. R92:23-24, 117:4-5; Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-408. That definition, which states "motor vehicle means a self-propelled vehicle that is 
intended primarily for use and operation on the highways," does not include an ATV, 
which is intended primarily for use and operation off of the highways. See Utah Code § 
76-6-410(l)(a)(2008). 
In response, the State sidestepped the argument of whether an ATV is an operable 
motor vehicle and moved to amend the charge to a class A misdemeanor. 
3
 At the time of the alleged offense, theft by receiving stolen property qualified as 
a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code section 76-6-412(l)(c) if the value of the 
8 
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R92:l 17:11,17. In support of its motion, the State argued that it would be reasonable for 
the court to assume that the value of the 2004 Honda Rancher ATV was more than $300 
and less than $1,000. R92:l 17:11-12. Since the district court did not have any evidence 
of the value of the 2004 Honda Rancher ATV, it denied the State's motion to amend the 
charge to a class A misdemeanor. R92:117:16-17. 
The district court concluded that an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle for 
purposes of the theft by receiving stolen property statute and, since there was no evidence 
of value presented at the preliminary hearing, the court bound the charge over as a class 
B misdemeanor:4 
Motor vehicle is defined as . . . a self-propelled vehicle that is 
intended primarily for use and operation on the highways. An 
ATV is not intended primarily for use and operation on the 
highway. That's just a matter of common sense that we 
follow and can take note of.... And so to bind this over as a 
second degree felony, the State would have to have presented 
evidence of value of the vehicle. I don't find that the 
information provided . . . is sufficient to either bind it over as 
a second degree felony or as a third degree felony [A]s it 
stands right now from the information that was provided at 
the preliminary hearing, I don't have any information about 
the value of this item and will bind it over as a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
property was or exceeded $300 but was less than $1,000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
412(l)(c) (LexisNexis 2008). 
4
 At the time of the alleged offense, theft by receiving stolen property qualified as 
a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code section 76-6-412(l)(d) when the property had 
some value but that value was less than $300. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(d) 
(LexisNexis 2008). 
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R92:l 17:16-17 (emphasis added). After the trial court announced its ruling, the State 
moved to reopen the preliminary hearing in order to present evidence of the value of the 
2004 Honda Rancher ATV. R92:l 17:17. After hearing argument on the motion, the trial 
court denied the State's motion to reopen the preliminary hearing and again stated that 
the case was going to be bound over as a class B misdemeanor. R92:117:18. 
In reliance on the district court's previous rulings denying the State's motion to 
reopen the preliminary hearing, and denying the State's motion to amend the charge to a 
class A misdemeanor, defense counsel moved to have the class B misdemeanor 
dismissed. R92:66-67. The basis for the motion was that, pursuant to Utah Code section 
78A-5-102(8), the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a single 
class B misdemeanor and that the charge was instead appropriately adjudicated in a 
justice court. R92:66-67; see also R92:l 18:3-5. The trial court agreed that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the charge without prejudice. R92:68, 118:5. 
Rather than filing the charge as a class B misdemeanor in a justice court, the State 
refiled the case for a third time, this time as a third degree felony in the district court. 
R71:1-2. The Information and accompanying probable cause statement do not allege any 
new evidence of value. R71:1-2. 
Defense counsel moved to have the case set before the judge who dismissed the 
previous filing of charges so that she could determine whether the third re file violated the 
standards set forth in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), for cases refiled after 
the State fails to produce sufficient evidence for bindover at a preliminary hearing. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R71:20. Both parties submitted written motions on the validity of the third refile, and the 
matter was set for a motion hearing. R71:21—102. 
At the motion hearing, defense counsel argued that refiling the charge as a third 
degree felony violated the standards set forth in Brickey, since any evidence of value 
presented by the State did not constitute new or previously unavailable evidence since it 
could have been, with ordinary diligence, produced at the previous preliminary hearing. 
R71:114:5-11. Counsel for Mr. Dykes also argued that pursuant to State v. Redd, 2001 
UT 113,117, 37 P.3d 1160, the State's failure to present any evidence on an essential 
element of the charged offense at the previous preliminary hearing did not constitute an 
innocent miscalculation or good cause to refile, and that absent new or previously 
unavailable evidence, the refile as a third degree felony violated Mr. Dykes's due process 
protections under Brickey. R71:114:8. 
Counsel for Mr. Dykes also argued that the State should be prohibited from 
refiling the charge as a third degree felony under the doctrine of res judicata,5 since the 
trial court previously denied the State's motion to reopen the preliminary hearing, and 
denied the State's motion to amend the charge to a class A misdemeanor, and instead 
amended the charge to a class B misdemeanor and dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction. R71:l 14:4-5. Counsel for Mr. Dykes asked the trial court to dismiss the case 
with prejudice. R71:114:11. 
5
 Although counsel for Mr. Dykes never used the term res judicata in argument, 
the legal concepts of res judicata and the related doctrine of the law of the case were 
argued to the trial court. 
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In response, the State offered evidence of value, two documents printed off of the 
Kelley Blue Book website the day prior to the hearing, showing suggested retail values of 
two different 2004 Honda Rancher ATVs.6 R71:l 14:11; R71:120-21. The prosecutor did 
not try to argue that this evidence was new or previously unavailable. R71:114:14. In fact 
the prosecutor admitted, "I overlooked this evidence and this is—this is not— anybody 
could have looked this up. A diligent lawyer on either side could have consulted Kelley. I 
made a mistake." R71:l 14:14-15. Instead, the prosecutor argued that pursuant to State v. 
Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, his mistake constituted an innocent miscalculation of 
the quantum of evidence needed for bindover. R71:l 14:11-17. The State conceded that 
an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle for purposes of the theft by receiving stolen 
property statute, but instead argued that the alleged victims of the crime should not be 
punished because the State made a mistake. R71:114:12, 20-21. 
The district court denied Mr. Dykes's Motion to Quash the Information. R71:103-
05; Addendum C (Ruling and Order). Even though the State did not present any evidence 
at the preliminary hearing on the element of the value of the allegedly stolen 2004 Honda 
Rancher ATV, and even though the district court recognized that the State's Kelley Blue 
Book printouts were not new or previously unavailable evidence, the court held that the 
State innocently miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary for bindover, and, 
since the defense did not show that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in 
6
 These two documents were not part of the charging documents for the third refile 
or otherwise included in the discovery; rather, they were provided to defense counsel at 
the motion hearing. R71:114:5. 
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miscalculating the evidence, dismissal was not appropriate. R71:103-05; Addendum C. 
Mr. Dykes petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of this order and this Court 
granted that petition. See Addendum A. This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State is prohibited by the due process clause of the Utah Constitution from 
refiling Class A Misdemeanor and Second and Third Degree Felony charges against Mr. 
Dykes. Unless the State offers new or previously unavailable evidence or otherwise 
demonstrates good cause, due process considerations bar refiling charges if those charges 
have been dismissed due to insufficient evidence after a preliminary hearing. State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). One type of "good cause" exists when a 
prosecutor "innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence necessary to bind over a 
defendant." State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113,1j 13, 37 P.3d 1160 (citing State v. Morgan, 
2001 UT 87, If 19, 34 P.3d 767). But such good cause does not exist when the State 
"refiles a charge when it has been dismissed for the State's failure to provide any 
evidence on a clear element of the relevant criminal statute." IdL j^ 17 (emphasis added). 
Rather, in that situation, "a potentially abusive practice exists" such that "the presumption 
is that the State has violated the due process rights of [the] defendant and is barred from 
refiling . . . excepting new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause." Id. 
This court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Dykes's Motion to 
Quash Information because refiling charges against Mr. Dykes despite failing to present a 
scintilla of evidence on an essential element of the offense at a previous preliminary 
hearing is a potentially abusive practice that violates Mr. Dykes's right to due process 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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under the Utah Constitution. Specifically, at Mr. Dykes's preliminary hearing, the State 
failed to present any evidence of the value of the allegedly stolen property Mr. Dykes 
allegedly received. Although the prosecutor may have misunderstood the law, the 
prosecutor did not innocently miscalculate the evidence necessary to bind over the 
defendant; instead, the prosecutor presented no evidence on an essential element of the 
offense. Under Redd, refiling charges after presenting no evidence on an essential 
element of those charges is a violation of Mr. Dykes's due process rights and this Court 
should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Dykes's Motion to Quash Information. 
2001 UT 113,^17. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REFILING FELONY CHARGES DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE VIOLATES MR. DYKES'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
BECAUSE THE STATE HAS NO NEW OR PREVIOUSLY 
UNAVAILABLE EVIDENCE OR GOOD CAUSE TO REFILE 
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Dykes's Motion to Dismiss because the 
State engaged in a potentially abusive practice without good cause when the prosecutor 
refiled charges against Mr. Dykes after failing to produce any evidence on an essential 
element of the offense at a previous preliminary hearing. The Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure permit the State to refile charges against a criminal defendant even though a 
magistrate has found at a preliminary hearing that there is no probable cause to bind the 
defendant over and, accordingly, has dismissed the information. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3). 
But a prosecutor's discretion to refile is not boundless. Because of "the potential for 
abuse inherent in the power to refile criminal charges," the due process clause of the Utah 
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Constitution "prohibits] a prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for 
insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." State v. Brickey, 714 
P.2d 644, 647. So, absent new or previously unavailable evidence, Brickey prohibits the 
State from refiling charges dismissed after a preliminary hearing without good cause. See 
id 
In this case, after the preliminary hearing, the district court quashed bindover on 
Mr. Dykes's felony charge because the State had not presented evidence that the 
allegedly stolen item was either an operable motor vehicle or valued at over $5,000—an 
element of the offense. See R92:l 17:16. Thus, because Mr. Dykes's felony charge was 
dismissed for insufficient evidence, under Brickey, the State may only refile felony 
charges if it presents new or previously unavailable evidence or if good cause justifies 
refiling. This brief will first show in Part A that the State has not presented new or 
previously unavailable evidence that might justify refiling. Part B then illustrates that 
good cause does not otherwise exist to refile even though the prosecutor might have 
mistakenly believed that an ATV is an "operable motor vehicle" under the theft by 
deception statute. Because the State has neither new or previously unavailable evidence, 
nor good cause to refile, refiling felony charges violates Mr. Dykes's due process rights 
under Brickey and the Utah Constitution and this Court should reverse the district court 
and quash the information. 
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A. As Found by the District Court, The State's Refiling of Felony Charges Is 
Not Justified by the Presence of New or Previously Unavailable Evidence. 
In this instance, it is not seriously disputed that the State's newly proffered 
evidence was neither new nor previously unavailable—that is, it was available at the time 
of the preliminary hearing and the State was simply dilatory in assembling it. Evidence is 
not "new" if the evidence "could have been discovered before the . . . preliminary hearing 
in the exercise of normal diligence." State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 865 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). And evidence is not "unavailable" if the State is "simply dilatory in assembling 
it." State v. Rogers, 2005 UT App 379, If 25, 122 P.3d 661, rev'd on other grounds, 2006 
UT 85, 151 P.3d 171; see also Morgan, 2001 UT 87, Tf 21 (recognizing that an officer's 
testimony that could have been offered at a previous preliminary hearing "was not new or 
unavailable at the first hearing"). The State has argued in its opposition to Mr. Dykes's 
Motion to Quash that evidence "which was not presented at the preliminary hearing due 
to the prosecutor's innocent miscalculation or error in tactic" constitutes "new" evidence. 
R71:89. But this conception of "new" evidence is inconsistent with Utah appellate courts' 
definition of the term, which does not excuse lack of diligence in assembly by the State— 
even if the State's error might still give rise to good cause for refiling. See Morgan, 2001 
UT 87, U 21; Fisk, 966 P.2d at 865. The State's newly proffered evidence of estimated 
value consists of two printouts from the Kelley's Blue Book website. R71:120-21. These 
printouts can be obtained by simply visiting the website and following a series of links 
and selecting the year, make, and model of the ATV—a 2004 Honda Rancher. The State 
has not argued that it could not have consulted Kelley's Blue Book or its website before 
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the preliminary hearing and in fact conceded the opposite at the hearing on the motion to 
quash. R71:l 14:12 ("[W]e ended up with no admissible evidence due to my mistake."); 
R71:l 14:14—15 ("I overlooked this [Kelley's Blue Book] evidence and this is—this is 
not—anybody could have looked this up. A diligent lawyer on either side could have 
consulted Kelley. I made a mistake."). Thus, the district court's finding in its Ruling and 
Order that the State has not provided new or previously unavailable evidence is correct 
and the Kelley Bluebook printouts do not justify refiling under Brickey. R71:104; 
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647; Morgan, 2001 UT 87, If 21. 
B. The State Does Not Otherwise Have Good Cause to Refile Felony Charges. 
Without new or previously unavailable evidence, under Brickey, the State may 
only refile charges against Mr. Dykes if "other good cause justifies refiling/' which is 
lacking in this case. 714 P.2d at 647. Although the State has asserted that the prosecutor 
made an "innocent miscalculation" that constitutes "good cause" to refile charges against 
Mr. Dykes, R71: 86-87, the State misapplies Utah Supreme Court case law to reach this 
result. Specifically, the State cites a narrow statement from State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 
K 14, 34 P.3d 767—that a prosecutor has good cause to refile when he innocently 
miscalculates the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause—for the 
proposition that any error that a prosecutor might characterize as an innocent 
miscalculation is good cause to refile. The district court erred when it adopted this 
reasoning in its Ruling and Order. 
The issue of when an innocent evidentiary miscalculation might constitute good 
cause to refile charges dismissed for insufficient evidence was addressed by the Utah 
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Supreme Court in State v. Morgan. 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767. In that case, a magistrate 
found at a preliminary hearing that a police officer did not have sufficient training to 
render an opinion about whether a certain quantity of methamphetamine found in the 
possession of the defendant was evidence of intent to distribute the drug. Id. f 4. As a 
result, the court bound the defendant over on a lesser, third degree felony charge of 
possession rather than a second degree felony charge of possession with intent to 
distribute as the information alleged. Id In response, the prosecutor moved to dismiss 
without prejudice so that the State could refile the higher charge and present additional 
evidence of intent to distribute. Id. After that motion was granted, the State refiled and 
offered the testimony of a more experienced police officer, who provided additional 
support for why the evidence seized was consistent with intent to distribute. Id. ^ f 5. 
Finding that the new evidence established probable cause of the intent to distribute, the 
magistrate bound the defendant over on the higher charge. Id. <f 6. 
The defendant responded by filing a Brickev motion that asked the trial court to 
dismiss the charge. Id. ^ f 7. In the Brickev motion, the defendant argued that the officer 
had been available at the first preliminary hearing, so his testimony was not new or 
previously unavailable evidence under Brickev. Id. ^ j 7. The district court denied the 
motion and, after being convicted, the defendant appealed. Id. ^ f 8. On appeal, the State 
argued that, despite not having new or previously unavailable evidence, "the prosecutor's 
'innocent miscalculation' of the evidence, i.e., the inadequate evidence to support a 
finding of intent to distribute, constituted 'other good cause' sufficient... to refile the 
case." Id. 11 9 (emphasis added). 
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The Utah Supreme Court held that, even without new or previously unavailable 
evidence, good cause for refiling exists "'when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the 
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover.'" See id. ^ 14 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 n.5). But the court carefully limited this holding, 
"emphasizing] that the miscalculation must be innocent, and that further investigation 
must be nondilatory and not otherwise infringe on due process rights of a defendant." Id. 
TI19. Further, the exception is not so broad as to encompass every kind of conceivable 
error a prosecutor might characterize as an innocent miscalculation. Rather, the term 
"innocent miscalculation" has a legal definition and is context specific—it relates only to 
innocent miscalculations of the quantum of evidence necessary for bindover; that is, 
innocent mistakes relating to how much evidence is necessary to establish probable 
cause. See idL^ 14, 17,25. 
The Utah Supreme Court further addressed the limitations of the "innocent 
miscalculation of evidence" doctrine in State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, 37 P.3d 1160. In 
that case, the court held that a failure to provide any evidence on an element of a charged 
offense is not an innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence necessary for 
bindover and is not good cause to refile charges. Id. f 17. Rather, the court held "that a 
potentially abusive practice exists where the State refiles a charge when it has been 
dismissed for the State's failure to provide any evidence on a clear element of the 
relevant criminal statute." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, it stands to reason that a 
prosecutor cannot have innocently miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary to 
bind a defendant over when no evidence was presented on an element of an offense 
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because regardless of how little evidence a prosecutor might innocently believe is 
necessary to establish probable cause, it is patently unreasonable to believe that a 
complete lack of evidence might satisfy the standard. 
Thus, in Redd, when the State refiled a charge of desecration of a dead human 
body after the court of appeals had held that the State had presented no evidence "on an 
essential element of the crime charged" at the preliminary hearing, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that refiling was not justified by good cause and constituted a potentially 
abusive practice. Id. fflf 16-17. "Accordingly, the presumption [was that] the State ha[d] 
violated the due process rights of [the] defendant and [wa]s barred from refiling in [that] 
instance excepting new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause." Id. ^ 17. 
And despite being faced with facts nearly identical to those in this case—where 
the State misinterpreted the elements of the crime charged—the court held that such 
misinterpretation did not constitute good cause to refile. See id, ^ 14, 17. A prima facie 
case of desecration of a dead human body requires the proof of three elements: a dead 
body that is buried or otherwise interred, disinterment of that body, and an "intentional" 
mens rea. Id. f^ 14. The State argued that the first and second elements of the crime were 
indistinguishable, such that it did not need to present evidence of burial or interment. Id ^ 
15. This Court rejected that interpretation and the Utah Supreme Court concurred with 
this Court's reasoning. Id. ffl[ 14-15. Here, the Supreme Court stated "[a]though not 
labeled first through third in the statute, the State's experienced legal counsel should have 
been able to extrapolate these three simple elements and provide evidence sufficient for a 
bindover." Id f 14. 
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Thus, while miscalculating the amount of evidence necessary to establish probable 
cause on each of the elements of an offense is good cause to refile a charge, 
misunderstanding what those elements are under the law and not presenting any evidence 
on one of them is not good cause to refile; rather, it is a potentially abusive practice that 
presumptively violates the due process rights of a defendant. Because the State did not 
present new or previously unavailable evidence and there was no good cause to refile, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the charge. Id. f 17. 
Here, as in Redd, the State failed to present evidence on a clear element of the 
offense charged in the information. The information charged Mr. Dykes with Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony. R92:2-3. It alleged that Mr. Dykes 
received, retained or disposed of property of another, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it 
probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, 
knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive 
the owner thereof, and the value of the property was or 
exceeded $5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle. 
R92:2. At the preliminary hearing, the State presented no evidence that the ATV's value 
exceeded $5,000, that it was a firearm, or that it was an operable motor vehicle. Instead, 
by the State's own admission, it relied on a prosecutor's overly broad interpretation of the 
felony theft statute that attempted to characterize an ATV as an "operable motor vehicle." 
R71:l 14:12, 20-21 ("The second case was dismissed because I made a mistake. I did. I 
erroneously asserted that it's a motor vehicle.... The issue here is what kind of an error 
is it and what was the result. This was not an error of not enough evidence resulting in a 
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dismissal for—for not binding over. This is an error, counsel's error in his legal strategy . 
. . . " ) . This may have been a strategic mistake—even an innocent strategic mistake—but 
this is not like Morgan where the prosecutor innocently miscalculated of the quantum of 
evidence needed to bind the defendant over; instead, this is like Redd, where no evidence 
was presented on a crucial element of the offense because the State relied on a mistaken 
understanding of the elements of the crime, as admitted by the prosecutor at the motion 
hearing below. Redd, 2001 UT 113,1ffl 14, 17. 
Regardless of the quantum of evidence the State produced to show that Mr. Dykes 
was in possession of an ATV, that evidence could never prove that he stole an operable 
motor vehicle under the theft statute because an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle 
under the theft statute. There could never be a situation, as in Morgan, where the State 
could mistakenly think that an inexperienced officer's testimony might be sufficient to 
establish that an ATV is an operable motor vehicle because as a matter of law, an ATV is 
not an operable motor vehicle. This is a situation, as in Redd, where the prosecutor has 
misunderstood the very conduct that is prohibited by the law he is using to charge a 
defendant and, as a result, has "failed to provide a scintilla of evidence on the element of 
the offense he misunderstood. Redd, 2001 UT 113, Tf 17. Under Redd, this is not an 
innocent miscalculation constituting good cause to refile; this is a potentially abusive 
practice that presumptively violates Mr. Dykes's due process rights. Id. And the Supreme 
Court's distinction does not elevate form over substance. When the State misunderstands 
what conduct is prohibited by the code and attempts to prosecute defendants for conduct 
that is not prohibited by the code, or conduct that is punished less excessively under the 
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code, the defendant bears the burden of the State's "creativity" by being subjected to 
multiple refilings. 
Thus, the reasoning underpinning the district court's ruling and order—that the 
State had good cause to refile because it "seemingly miscalculated the evidence in filing 
the original Second Degree felony charges"—is fatally flawed. R71:105. The State did 
not innocently miscalculate the quantum of evidence necessary to bind Mr. Dykes over 
for allegedly receiving a stolen car, as Morgan requires for refiling charges; rather, it 
misinterpreted the elements of the offense and failed to produce any evidence on one of 
those elements—a practice Redd condemns as being potentially abusive. As a result, the 
State has presumptively violated Mr. Dykes's due process rights and, having presented no 
new or previously unavailable evidence or good cause, is prohibited by the due process 
clause of the Utah Constitution from refiling any charge higher than the Class B 
Misdemeanor for which he was bound over. Redd, 2001 UT 113, f^ 17; Brickey, 714 P.2d 
at 645, 647-48. Thus, this Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Dykes's 
Motion to Quash Information. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Dykes's Motion to 
Quash Information because the State has refiled charges previously dismissed for 
insufficient evidence without presenting new or previously unavailable evidence or 
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otherwise demonstrating good cause to refile. This violates Mr. Dykes's due process 
rights under the Utah Constitution and requires reversal. 
SUBMITTED this ®\ day of June, 2011. 
E. Rich Hawkes 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, E. Rich Hawkes, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an 
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this _ 3 _ day of June, 2011. 
E. Rich Hawkes 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this °V day of June, 2011. 
<U fc-4fr^-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Jeremy J. Dykes, 
Defendant and Petitioner, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20100582-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Thorne, and Roth. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. This court will notify the parties upon 
setting a briefing schedule. 
Dated this >^ ' day of October, 2010. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Orme, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 19, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
TERESA L. WELCH 
ELIZABETH A LORENZO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LAURA B DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & SUSAN NORBY 
450 S STATE ST BX 1860 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this October 19, 2010. 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20100582 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 101901771 
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UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 7 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 76-6-408 
§ 76-6-408. Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from 
the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an actor 
who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used 
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative 
of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to require the 
seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next 
to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing 
it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the de-
fendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or col-
lecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, 
or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, con-
cealed, or withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection 
(2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, re-
ceived, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in 
Section 76-10-901. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or 
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same property back again to 
the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security on 
the property and takes or receives the personal property into his possession and who sells 
the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other personal 
property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of 
the property. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 76-6-412 
§ 76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $55000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1 -601, at the time 
of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary with 
intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property taken is a stallion, 
mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, 
poultry, or a fur-bearing animal raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or exceeds $300 but is 
less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits theft 
of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(1 )(b)(iii), is civilly liable for three times the 
amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and rea-
sonable attorneys' fees. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEREMY JAMES DYKES, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 101901771 
Judge Michele M. Christiansen 
Date: July 1,2010 
The above matter came before the court for decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
submitted June 22, 2010 on the grounds that it was re-filed in violation of the State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Being fully advised, the court makes the following ruling: 
The Court finds that because the prosecutor innocently miscalculated the quantum of 
evidence and the defense is unable to show that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in 
miscalculating the evidence, dismissal pursuant to State v. Brickey is inappropriate because no 
presumptive bar to refiling exists. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3) allows a magistrate to dismiss and discharge a defendant if the 
State's evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the 
charged crime, but Rule 7 also allows the State to refile as "dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the State from instituting subsequent prosecution for the same offense." However, state 
due process protections prohibit a "prosecutor from refilling criminal charges earlier dismissed 
for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
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evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refilling." State v. Brickey 714 P.2d 644, 
647 (Utah 1986). 
The primary purposes underlying the Brickey rule is to preclude a prosecutor from 
seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant through forum shopping by harassing a defendant 
through repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges, or from withholding evidence. 
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, If 15, 34 P.3d 767 (emphasis added). 
The Brickey analysis indicates that "new or previously unavailable evidence" and "good 
cause" represent two broad categories that allow for refilling and "other good cause." The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "good cause" may exist "when a prosecutor innocently 
miscalculates the quantum of evidence" required to obtain a bind over. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \ 
14. And while the Utah Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's innocent miscalculation of 
the necessary quantum of evidence is sufficient grounds to refile, due process violations are not 
necessarily implicated when charges are refilled as long as the miscalculation is innocent and 
further investigation does not violate due process rights of the defendant. Id. at \ 19. 
The State first filed charges against the defendant in April 2009, but the case was 
dismissed without prejudice because the State's witnesses were not present. At the September 3, 
2009, preliminary hearing, the second time the State filed charges against the defendant, the 
Judge found probable cause to bind the matter over as charged as a Second Degree Felony. After 
the Court denied the State's request to re-open the Preliminary Hearing and bound the case over 
as a class B misdemeanor, the State filed the current matter a third time as a Third Degree 
Felony. And while the defense has not received new or previously unavailable evidence, Brickey 
allows for refiling for "other good cause." Here, the prosecution has good cause in refiling as 
they seemingly innocently miscalculated the evidence in filing the original Second Degree felony 
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charges that subsequently led to the State filing the charges as a Third Degree Felony. This 
Court originally found that the matter would not be bound over as a second degree felony 
because an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle, and when the case was bound over as a class 
B misdemeanor, the court granted Defense Counsel's Motion to dismiss based on lack of 
jurisdiction. Other than certain doggedness to refile this matter, ostensibly to protect the rights 
of the victim, the facts do not indicate that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in 
refiling the charges. The Court determines that the prosecution has not engaged in forum 
shopping, the refiling does not appear to be a tactic to withhold evidence from the defense, and, 
based upon the original bindover by Judge Hilder, the charges are not groundless or improvident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court denies the motion to dismiss, for while Brickey limits the State's ability to 
refile charges that have been dismissed for insufficient evidence, it does not intend to preclude 
refiling where a defendant's due process rights are not implicated. Absent abusive practices (e.g, 
forum shopping, groundless and improvident charges, withholding evidence), no presumptive 
bar to refile exits. Morgan, 2001 UT 87 f 16. And while a prosecutor's mistake may 
inconvenience the defense, due process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience 
because the "nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals 
who have been accused of crimes." Id. at % 22 (quoting People v. Noline, 917 P.2d 1256, 1264 
(Colo. 1996)). 
DATED this J day of July, 2010. 
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